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The Question of Land Grab in Africa and the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Traditional 
Lands, Territories and Resources 
 
STEFAAN SMIS, DOROTHÉE CAMBOU & GENNY NGENDE1 
On 13 September 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).2 This event 
was not only a landmark for the indigenous peoples’ movement but also 
constituted an important contribution to the universal human rights 
system. The declaration has indeed, after two decades of difficult 
negotiations, finally acknowledged that indigenous peoples are, as a 
group, holders of human rights.3  
The adoption of the UNDRIP has confirmed that indigenous 
peoples’ rights are crystallizing into rules of international law at the 
universal level. These developments have also been reflected regionally 
in the inter-American and, to a lesser extent, the African human rights 
system even though none of these regional human rights systems have 
adopted a binding legal instrument specifically addressing indigenous 
peoples’ rights.4 Nevertheless, through an “evolutive” interpretation of 
regional human rights instruments, the Inter-American Court of Human 
 
 The contribution is based on a paper presented at the conference on “Africa and International 
Law. Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” Albany NY, 12–14 April 2012.  
 1. Stefaan Smis is professor of international dispute settlement, international human rights 
law and methodology of law at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of the Vrije Universiteit 
Brussels (Belgium) and reader in international criminal law at the School of Law of the 
University of Westminster (UK). He has widely published on African issues. Dorothée Cambou 
and Genny Ngende are PhD researchers at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussels.  
 2. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/61/L.67 and Add. 1 (Sept. 13, 2007).  
 3. See id.; Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. 
RTS. (last visited Mar. 3, 2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx (showing two decades of 
difficult negotiations).  
 4. See Areas of Work, INT’L LAB. ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Aboutus/HistoryofILOswork/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 
13, 2013); See Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE 
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 
http://www.oas.org/consejo/cajp/Indigenous%20documents.asp#Record (last visited Mar. 3. 
2013) [hereinafter Working Group].  
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Rights, and recently the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, are developing an interesting body of “case law” that is 
contributing to a firmer understanding of indigenous peoples’ rights.5  
The growing recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights must be 
confronted with the daily practice where we witness that Africa’s land is 
again the object of foreign greed. Massive portions of land are currently 
being purchased by foreign investors far below market prices and often 
without the consent of those who live from the land, with the aim to turn 
these lands into lucrative projects where the state will have lost almost 
all rights.6 The phenomenon that has been termed “land grab” has 
recently started to attract attention worldwide due to its intensification 
as a result of the global financial, food and energy crises.7 Africa is, 
however, most affected by it.8 
In the current context of Africa where controversy still exists as to 
who can be considered an indigenous people and where great areas of 
land are becoming the object of “land grabbing” projects, a better 
understanding and protection of the indigenous peoples’ right to their 
land and resources is becoming a crucial issue for the survival of many 
of these population groups. This issue has not received sufficient 
attention in legal doctrine.  
This contribution starts with a brief description of the causes 
leading to the phenomenon of land grab in Africa, followed by an 
overview of the instruments that have been adopted at the international 
level to protect indigenous peoples’ rights. The UNDRIP will be 
presented as constituting the minimum standards for the survival, 
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world,9 and 
having the ambition to be a comprehensive instrument reflecting the 
current stand of indigenous rights in international law. The paper then 
continues with a description of some controversial issues in the 
UNDRIP relevant for the topic under research. Subsequently, this paper 
analyzes the recent practice at the African regional level, and then ends 
with some concluding remarks regarding the compatibility of land grab 
practices with standards on indigenous rights. 
 
 5. See, e.g., Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) & Minority Rights Grp. Int'l on behalf 
of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya,  276/2003, Afr. Comm'n, ¶¶ 151, 162.  
 6. Soja Vermeulen & Lorenzo Cotula, Over the Heads of Local People: Consultation, 
Consent and Recompense in Large-scale Land Deals for Biofuels Projects in Africa, 37 J. 
PEASANT STUD. 899 (2010), available at 
http://ccafs.cgiar.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Vermeulen__Cotula_2010.pdf.  
 7. Phoebe Stephens, The Global Land Grab: An Analysis of Extant Governance 
Institutions, 20 INT’L AFF. REV. 3 (2011).  
 8. Klaus Deininger, Challenges Posed by the New Wave of Farmland Investment, 38 (2) J. 
PEASANT STUD. 217, 218 (2011).  
 9. G.A. Res 61/295, supra note 2, art. 43.  
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II.  THE ISSUE OF LAND GRAB IN AFRICA 
Today, in a context of financial uncertainty, which in turn has 
exposed the gravity of related deficiencies such as food insecurity, 
many governments are realizing how vital primary resources such as 
land can be.10 Conversely, multinational companies in rich and 
emerging markets have recently targeted specific countries in Africa to 
secure land deals to respond to the food security problems,11 energy 
crisis and the corresponding need to turn to biofuel production.12 Also, 
the high return that agricultural investment projects seem to generate is 
an additional reason for the new interest in Africa’s land.13 
The financial crisis ushered in a new prospective in investment 
opportunities in the form of agricultural land because the economic 
collapse left investors searching for new ways to “channel their 
funds.”14 The surge in land grab is premised on an insatiable need for 
arable land, which in turn has been motivated by the need for food 
security.15 It is asserted that a nexus exists between the influx of 
speculative investments by hedge funds, pension funds and banks and 
the increase in staple crop prices.16 The richness and fertility of African 
soil, coupled with the financial turnover and economic viability in 
investing in the continent has led to a race to acquire African land.17 
Another driving force is the “climate of corporate driven globalization, 
neo-liberal policy regimes and natural exploitation,” which has also 
paved the way for the acquisition of land that is occurring at an 
exponential rate.18 This makes Africa fertile ground to exploit and to 
further this neo-liberal agenda, as cheap and “unused” and/or 
“unproductive” land has become attractive in lieu of the recent 
economic climate.19  
The cultivation of energy crops abroad is another reason for the 
purchasing of African land.20 As volatility in food commodity prices 
 
 10. Stephens, supra note 7, at 3, 5.  
 11. Cecilie Friis & Anette Reenberg, Land Grab in Africa: Emerging Land System Drivers 
in a Teleconnected World, GLOBAL LAND PROJECT REP. NO. 1. GLP-IPO, at 4–5 (2010); 
Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Jennifer Franco, From Threat to Opportunity? Problems With the Idea 
of a ‘Code of Conduct’ for Land-Grabbing, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 508 (2010).  
 12. Id.  
 13. Harry Stephan, Ryan Lobban & Jessica Benjamin, Land Acquisitions in Africa: A Return 
to Franz Fanon, 2(1) INT’L J. FOR HISTORICAL STUD. 78 (2010); GRAIN, Pension Funds: Key 
Players in the Global Farmland Grab (June 2011), at 2.  
 14. Stephens, supra note 7, at 4.  
 15. Stephan, supra note 13, at 78.  
 16. Stephens, supra note 7, at 6.  
 17. Stephan, supra note 13, at 77.  
 18. Land and Research Action Network, Introduction: Global Land Grabs: Investments, 
Risks and Dangerous Legacies, 54 DEVELOPMENT 5 (2011).  
 19. Stephens, supra note 7, at 4.  
 20. Id. at 5.  
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became apparent, it translated into volatility in oil prices; hence the 
need to replace fossil fuels with biofuels.21 This is considered to be a 
win-win situation for all parties involved, as biodiversity will enable a 
foreign state or corporation to meet its ever-increasing demand for 
energy.22 Conversely, the African state is said to benefit from the 
income derived from these deals, which will supposedly increase 
employment and lead to other opportunities.23  
According to the Global Land Project, in 2010, between 51 and 63 
million hectares of land were either part of finalized land deals or under 
negotiation in 27 African States.24 Deininger, a senior economist at the 
World Bank, asserts that the 2009 demand for land in the continent was 
equivalent to the total land development in the region over the previous 
20 years.25 Prices in Africa for land purchasing or leasing are considered 
to be at a very low rate; thus the demand is satisfied by an abundant 
supply.26 The inference drawn here is that sale or lease transactions are 
more prevalent in the region than in others. Some authors have referred 
to this as the “new scramble for Africa.”27 In light of this, one may 
speak of the “africanization of land grab.” 
One of the most controversial land deals was that of the Daewoo-
Madagascar lease agreement, which permitted a South Korean 
corporation to lease 3.2 million acres of land for a period of ninety-nine 
years.28 This amount consisted of half of Madagascar’s arable land.29 
This was also a prime example of a government authorizing deals 
without consultation or due regard to all relevant stakeholders.30 Subject 
 
 21. Id. at 6.  
 22. Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Jennifer Franco, From Threat to Opportunity? Problems with 
the Idea of a ‘Code of Conduct’ for Land-Grabbing, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 508, 510 
(2010).  
 23. Id.  
 24. Friis & Reenberg, supra note 11, at 11.  
 25. Klaus Deininger, Challenges Posed by the New Wave of Farmland Investment, 38(2) J. 
PEASANT STUD. 218 (2011).  
 26. Vermeulen, supra note 6, at 23.  
 27.  JEREMIE GILBERT, THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS-
BASED APPROACH TO LARGE SCALE AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE SADC REGION, IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY LAND ISSUES. TOWARDS A NEW SUSTAINABLE LAND 
RELATIONS POLICY 144–68 (Ben Chigara ed., 2012); Vermeulen, supra note 6; Richard Ingwe, 
James Okoro & Joseph K. Ukwayi, The New Scramble for Africa: How large-Scale Acquisition of 
Subsaharan Africa’s Land by Multinational Corporations and Rich Countries Threatens 
Sustainable Development, 12(3) J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. AFR. (2010), available at http://www.jsd-
africa.com/Jsda/V12No3_Summer2010_A/PDF/The%20New%20Scramble%20for%20Africa,%
20How%20Large-Scale%20Acquisition%20of%20Sub-
Saharan%20Africa’s%20Land%20(Ingwe,%20Okoro,%20Ukwayi).pdf.  
 28. Stephans, supra note 7, at 82.  
 29. Sheila Oviedo, Avoiding the Land Grab. Responsible Farmland Investing in Developing 
Nations, SUSTAINALYTICS, (July 2011), 
http://www.sustainalytics.com/sites/default/files/avoiding-the-land-grab-responsible-farmland-
investing-in-developingnations_final.pdf.  
 30. Id.  
10/16/2013 10:58 AM   
2013] Land Grab in Africa  497 
 
to the national backlash and the coup d’état that subsequently ensued, 
the deal was eventually terminated.31 Similar experiences confront local 
populations elsewhere in Africa. In Sierra Leone, 12,500 hectares of 
land are being rented by a French company, and in 2010 a Swiss 
company acquired another 10,000 hectares.32 In Guinea, 100,000 
hectares of land were purchased by an American company.33 A 
Singapore-based company purchased 300,000 hectares of land in 
Gabon, and a Belgian firm acquired 20,000 hectares for oil and 100,000 
hectares of concession for livestock.34 
These widespread land purchases have been accompanied by 
claims of entire villages being expropriated of their land. Often it is 
indigenous peoples who are being deprived of their land.35 Communal 
land rights are being undermined by private ownership.36 This is clearly 
highlighted by Shalmali Guttal, who claims that “[w]here [commons 
(water, land)] have not been individually appropriated, they are termed 
‘state property’ by default.”37 Investors sign contracts with 
governments, which in turn, claim the land as state-owned.38 A 2010 
World Bank report on the rising global interest in farmland shows that 
land grabbing has often taken place in regions where governments are 
corrupt or indebted.39 Many of the investments did not result in 
developmental growth for (African) states, and the local population was 
left far worse than they were before the sale.40 The report also makes 
reference to “yield gaps,” which refers to the exploitation of high arable 
land-to-yield ratios that benefit wealthy corporations and countries.41  
Since these deals often do not take the interest of indigenous 
populations into account and consent has not been received, this article 
will analyze which rights to land and resources indigenous people have 
under international and regional law to be able to draw conclusions as to 
the compatibility of these land acquisition projects with the emerging 
standards on indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 
 31. Id. at 2.  
 32. GRAIN, Land Grabbing and the Global Food Crisis (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.viacampesina.org/downloads/pdf/en/landgrabGRAIN-dec2011.pdf, at 22.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic 
Revolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 60 INT’L & COMP. L. 
QUART. 250 (2011).  
 36. See Land Research Action Network, Introduction: Global Land Grabs: Investments, 
Risks and Dangerous Legacies, 54 DEVELOPMENT 5, 7 (2011).  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. See Saturnino M. Borras Jr. et al., Towards a Better Understanding of Global Land 
Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 210 (2011).  
 40. Land Research Action Network, supra note 36, at 2.  
 41. Id.  
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III.  INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THEIR RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A.  Overview of Instruments and Initiatives at the Universal Level 
The cause of indigenous people has come under the limelight of 
the international community over the course of the last decades of the 
20th century.42 Before, it was an issue that only sporadically attracted 
some attention within the community of states, mainly in the context of 
the fight against discrimination and the endeavor to assimilate “tribal” 
and “subordinated” communities to the modernized majority.43 During 
colonial times, some punctual initiatives by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) had been taken,44 but the first instrument to really 
address the question in a more comprehensive manner was the 1957 
ILO Convention No. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in 
Independent Countries (Convention No. 107),45 supported by a 
Recommendation linked to that convention, namely the Indigenous and 
Tribal Populations Recommendation (Recommendation No. 104).46 
Ratified by twenty-seven states, a majority of which are countries of 
Latin America, the Convention had the objective to address, as a 
binding legal instrument, the marginalization and discrimination of 
indigenous and tribal populations by recognizing a number of rights and 
freedoms.47 Examples are the prohibition from compulsory service, the 
right not to be discriminated against, and the right to life, education, 
social security, health, and participation.48 More relevant for this 
contribution and even though it had afterwards been considered as 
 
 42. Julian Burger & Paul Hunt, Towards the International Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights, 12 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 406 (1994). (The famous lectures of Professor 
Fransisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) of the University of Salamanca and the works of the other 
famous sixteenth century Spanish scholar Bartolome de las Casas prove that this is not totally 
true). But see, e.g., Greg Marks, Indigenous Peoples in International Law: The Significance of 
Fransisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas, 13 AUST’L Y.B. INT’L L. 1–52 (1992).  
 43. Julian Burger & Paul Hunt, Towards the International Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights, 12 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 406 (1994).  
 44. The International Labour Organization showed interest in the situation of indigenous 
peoples already in the early 1920s. It then undertook a number of studies and in 1926 established 
the Committee of Experts on Native Labour to agree on standards for the protection of indigenous 
workers.  
 45. Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (entered 
into force June 2, 1959) [hereinafter ILO Convention 107].  
The convention is no longer open for ratification but remains in force for seventeen states from 
which five are African: Angola, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, and Tunisia.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.; Athanasios Yupsanis, ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries 1989-2009: an Overview, 3 NORDIC J.  INT'L LAW 79, 433–56 
(2010).  
 48. ILO Convention 107, supra note 45, art. 3.  
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insufficient, the Convention recognized a right to individual and 
collective ownership of land traditionally occupied (Art. 11 Convention 
No. 107).49 The Convention also protected indigenous and tribal 
populations against removal from their lands without their free consent 
(Art. 12 Convention No. 107).50 However, for reasons of national 
security, national economic development, or indigenous health, broad 
exceptions were provided, allowing state parties to significantly curtail 
the right to land.51 In case of displacement, compensation for lost land 
was to be granted of a “quality at least equal to those of the lands 
previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs 
and future development.”52 Convention No. 107 placed the question of 
indigenous and tribal populations on the international agenda.53 
Convention No. 107 was, however, often criticized for its 
“assimilationist” and paternalistic approach as the underlying 
assumption was that traditional customs and culture were an 
impediment to social and economic development of the communities 
concerned as well as the states in which they were living.54  
Succumbing to the growing criticism, in 1986, an ILO meeting of 
experts concluded that the language of Convention No. 107 was 
“outdated” and “destructive in the modern world” and unanimously 
recommended to revise the Convention.55 As a result, steps were taken 
to draft a more up-to-date legal instrument, and in 1989, the 
International Labour Conference adopted Convention 169 Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,56 which 
 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. art. 12.  
 51. ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS: 
SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 63 (2007).  
 52. ILO Convention 107, supra note 45, art. 12(2).  
 53. Id. at preamble. The preamble and several provisions of the ILO Convention 107 
confirm this statement. The indigenous and tribal populations are referred to as “less advanced” 
and governments are requested to integrate them progressively into the life of their state society 
hoping that they would disappear as separate groups once they have integrated into the national 
society. See Lee Swepston, A New Step in the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 682 (1990). See generally 
S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).  
 54. ILO Convention 107, supra note 45, Preamble.  
 55. Rep. of the Meeting of the Experts, ¶ 46, reprinted in Partial Revision of Indigenous and 
Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107), Report VI(1), International Labour Conference, 
75th Sess., at 100–18,  (Geneva 1988); see Russel Lawrence Barsh, Revision of ILO Convention 
No. 107, 81 AM. J.  INT’L L. 756 (1987).  
 56. Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Sept. 
5, 1990, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989). hereinafter ILO Convention 169; See Athanasios Yupsanis, ILO 
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 1989-
2009: an Overview, 3 NORDIC J.  INT'L LAW 79, 433–56 (2010); Swepston, supra note 53; 
ANAYA, supra note 53, at 47–49; INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INDIGENOUS & 
TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 (2009).  
10/16/2013 10:58 AM   
500 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:493 
 
revised and improved the previous convention.57 The Convention has 
since been ratified by some twenty-two states.58 Reacting against the 
assimilationist tendency of Convention No. 107, Convention No. 169 
now recognized a right of indigenous and tribal peoples to live and 
develop as distinct communities.59 The Preamble confirms this shift of 
paradigm by stating “the developments which have taken place in 
international law since 1957, as well as developments in the situation of 
indigenous and tribal peoples in all regions of the world have made it 
appropriate to adopt new international standards on the subject with a 
view to removing the assimilationist orientation of earlier standards.”60 
A more elaborate and better adapted catalogue of rights is proposed in 
the Convention—from non-discrimination to specific economic, social 
and cultural rights as well as rights on participation, co-management 
and self-governance.61 Also, the provisions on land rights, which were 
highly criticized,62 were rephrased to better protect indigenous peoples 
inter alia via procedural mechanisms.63 Compared to its predecessor, 
Convention No. 169 has been considered a major improvement.64 Other 
ILO conventions that are relevant to the protection of the rights of 
indigenous peoples but are not specifically addressed to them are the 
Conventions on Equality of Opportunity and Treatment in Employment 
and Occupation and the Conventions Against Forced Labour.65 Despite 
the fact that only one African state recently ratified Convention 169, 
ILO has initiated various projects aimed at assisting indigenous and 
tribal peoples in Africa as well as their governments.66 Countries such 
as Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Morocco, 
Tanzania, and South Africa were among the beneficiaries of such 
support.67 The ILO also supported the African Commission on Human 
 
 57. ANAYA, supra note 53, at 47.  
 58. See NORMLEX, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169. Among 
the twenty-two state parties to the Convention there is only one African state that has recently 
ratified the Convention—the Central African Republic.  
 59. See Sharon Venne, The New Language of Assimilation: A Brief Analysis of ILO 
Convention no. 169, 2 WITHOUT PREJUDICE 53 (1990).  
 60. ILO Convention 169, supra note 56, at 1384.  
 61. See id.  
 62. XANTHAKI, supra note 51, at 80. She asserts that the outdated land rights provisions of 
Convention 107 were one of the main reasons why the Convention had to be revised.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 90.  
 65. See Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, 
June 4, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960) [hereinafter ILO Convention 
111]; Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 L.N.T.S. 55 
(entered into force May 1, 1932) [hereinafter ILO Convention 29]; Convention Concerning the 
Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959) 
[hereinafter ILO Convention 105].  
 66. Areas of Work, supra note 4.  
 67. FELIX MUKWIZA NDAHINDA, INDIGENOUSNESS IN AFRICA: A CONTESTED LEGAL 
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and Peoples’ Rights, particularly in the context of research devoted to 
the analysis of constitutions, legislation and administrative acts in 
Africa with a view to better grasp the needs for indigenous protection.68  
Around the same time, the General Assembly of the Organization 
of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution requesting the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to draft a juridical instrument 
on indigenous populations in the Americas.69 This drafting of an 
“American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations” took 
significant delay and is still under consideration by a working group of 
the Permanent Council.70 This, however, as shown below, did not 
prevent the Inter-American Court on Human Rights from interpreting 
the American Convention on Human Rights or the ILO Convention 169 
in such a way that allowed the protection of indigenous rights to come 
within the ambit of the Court’s competence.71 The organization even 
took the lead when it came to indigenous peoples’ protection.72 An 
interesting body of case law on indigenous peoples’ rights73 also served 
as inspiration for the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in its first “indigenous peoples” case: the Endorois case. 
It all started in the UN in 1971 when the UN Sub-Commission on 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR EMPOWERMENT OF ‘MARGINALIZED’ COMMUNITIES 143–44 (2011); see also 
the references to the projects on the ILO, website at www.ilo.org.  
 68. See, e.g., International Labour Organization, Centre for Human Rights (University of 
Pretoria) and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Research findings workshop 
Report examining constitutional, legislative and administrative provisions concerning indigenous 
and tribal peoples in Africa (2009), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Resources/Eventdocumentation/Workshopseminarreports/WCMS_
118117/lang--en/index.htm.   
 69. OAS, General Assembly, 19th Regular Sess., Reports of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 1022, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/ 
RES/1022 (XIX-0/89) 1989, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/AG-RES_1022_XIX-O-
89_eng.pdf (intending inter alia to use the opportunity provided by the 500th anniversary of the 
“meeting” of the two worlds in 1992 to adopt a juridical instrument relevant to human rights 
protection of indigenous peoples). See Maria Magdalena Gomez Rivera, El Derecho Indígena 
Frente al Espejo de America Latina, 26 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS 
HUMANOS 54-58 (1998); see also Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Los Derechos Indígenas en el Sistema 
International: Un Sujeto en Construcción, 26 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 101–02 (1998).  
 70. See Working Group, supra note 4 (showing a list of documents illustrating the 
cumbersome process of drafting an American declaration on the rights of indigenous 
populations).   
 71. ILO Convention 169, supra note 56.  
 72. Id.  
 73. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Feb. 1, 2000); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
(Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (June 17, 2005); Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Aug. 12, 2008).  
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the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed 
a special rapporteur to prepare a study on discrimination against 
indigenous populations.74 Meanwhile, indigenous peoples lobbied 
successfully for the creation of a working group to instigate the 
development of human rights standards for indigenous peoples.75 In 
1982, the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples was created76 with a 
mandate “to review developments pertaining to the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
populations and to give special attention to the evolution of standards 
concerning the rights of indigenous populations.”77 The UN declared 
1993 as the year of the Indigenous Peoples and later that year, the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution proclaiming an international 
decade of the world’s indigenous peoples beginning December 10, 
1994, with the aim of “strengthening international cooperation for the 
solution of problems faced by indigenous communities in areas such as 
human rights, the environment, development, education, and health.”78 
In July 2000, ECOSOC adopted by consensus a resolution by which to 
establish a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to “serve as an 
advisory body to the Council with a mandate to discuss indigenous 
issues within the mandate of the Council relating to economic and social 
development, culture, the environment, education, health and human 
rights.”79 The Commission on Human Rights has appointed a Special 
 
 74. The study was finally completed in 1983 when the last part was submitted. See Study of 
the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: Final Report Submitted by the 
Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 (1983) (Mr. Jose R. Martinez Cobo) 
[hereinafter Cobo Final Report].  
 75. Robert T. Coulter, The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: What 
is it? What does it mean?, 13 NETHERLANDS QUARTERLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (1995); 
Asbjorn Eide, The Indigenous Peoples, The Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the 
Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in MAKING THE 
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 32 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009) [hereinafter Adoption of the UN 
Dec]; Erica-Irene A Daes, The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations to 
the Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in 
MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 48 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).  
 76. The Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Working Group) is composed of five 
members of the Sub-Commission who are appointed by its chairperson. Representatives of states 
and indigenous peoples are encouraged to attend and participate in the annual meetings held in 
Geneva.  
 77. Econ. and Soc. Council Res. 1982/34 (May 7, 1982).  
 78. G.A. Res. 48/163, U.N. Doc. A/RES /48/163 (Dec. 21 1993); G.A. Res. 47/75, ¶ 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/47/75 (Dec 14 1992). Also, on 20 December 2004 the General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 59/174 proclaiming a second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People 
to commence on 1 January 2005. See G.A. Res. 59/174, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/174 (Dec. 20, 
2004).  
 79. Econ. and Soc. Council Res. 2000/22 (July 28, 2000). In the Permanent Forum, an equal 
number of representatives of indigenous peoples and representatives of governments sit in their 
personal capacity.  
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Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people, which mandate has been renewed by the Human 
Rights Council.80 In December 2007, an expert mechanism was set up 
to advise the Council on questions relating to the promotion and 
protection of human rights of indigenous peoples.81  
To date, the most significant contribution to indigenous rights has 
been the drafting of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. Initiated in 1985, the Working Group was able to finalize the 
text of the Draft Declaration at its eleventh session, in 1993.82 The text 
then moved its way through the UN human rights standard- setting 
machinery.83 First, the text was adopted without vote by the Sub-
Commission (26 August 1994),84 followed, in 2006, by a positive vote 
of the Human Rights Council, which had recently replaced the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.85 Subsequently, on 13 September 2007, 
the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration by a vote of 143 in 
favor, 11 abstentions and 4 against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and the United States of America).86 All who are concerned with the 
situation of indigenous peoples have welcomed the Declaration as a 
major step in the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights and view it as 
a significant contribution in the broader area of the protection of human 
rights.    
B.  Analysis of the Controversial Questions in the UNDRIP 
The Declaration is a lengthy treaty-like document composed of 24 
preambular paragraphs, and an operative body totaling 46 substantive 
articles.87 The drafting process of the text “reflect[s] an extraordinary 
liberal, transparent, and democratic procedure . . . that encouraged broad 
and unified indigenous input.”88 Some of the main hurdles in the 
 
 80. Human Rights Council Res. 6/12 (Sept. 28, 2007).  
 81. Human Rights Council Res. 6/36 (Dec. 14, 2007).  
 82. Chairperson-Rapporteur on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its 11th Sess., Aug. 23, 
1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 at 50–60  (1993).  
 83. See generally Adoption of the UN Dec, supra note 75, at 108–37.   
 84. Comm. on H.R., Rep. of the Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, on its 46th Sess., Aug. 1–26, 2004, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994) at 103.  
 85. H.R. Council, Rep. to the General Assembly on the 1st Session of the Human Rights 
Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (2006) at 52–56.  
 86. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says President, 
U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) (Australia, Canada and New Zealand have since 
reconsidered their position and have officially endorsed the UN Declaration. US president Obama 
has also declared that the US supports the Declaration.).  
 87. G.A. Res 61/295, supra note 2.  
 88. Erica-Irène A. Daes, Dilemmas Posed by the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 63 NORDIC J.  OF INT’L L. 206 (1994). See also John B. Henriksen, The UN 
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drafting of the UNDRIP were: the defining of indigenous peoples, the 
reference to their right to self-determination, and their access to 
traditional lands, territories and resources—rights which received a 
prominent place in the UNDRIP despite numerous states’ reluctance to 
including these rights during the drafting process.89 These controversial 
issues, addressed in the UNDRIP, will be briefly analyzed below. 
1.  Who are indigenous peoples? 
International practice has shown that quite some controversy exists 
as to the definition of groups, bearer of human rights under international 
law.90 It is not different with indigenous peoples. Although some of the 
instruments discussed above have attempted to define the right 
holders,91 the UNDRIP has decided to “agree to disagree” with the 
objective of upholding the project of the declaration.92 At times, 
representatives of indigenous peoples and state representatives have had 
radically opposing views.93 While many state representatives rejected 
 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Some Key Issues and Events in the Process, in 
MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 32, 74 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).  
 89. International Law Association, ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (The 
Hague 2010) at 20 [hereinafter ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples]; Henriksen, 
supra note 88, at 79–81.  
 90. See, e.g., Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 168 (1991).  
 91. ILO Conventions referred to above have defined the right holders. If one takes ILO 
Convention 169, a tribal people is a group “whose social, cultural and economic conditions 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated 
wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations.” Highly 
relevant is whether they “descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the 
establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some 
or all of their own social, economic and cultural and political institutions.” To these more 
objective criteria an important subjective one is added namely “self-identification as indigenous 
or tribal” group. See ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries entered into force on 5 September 1990, Text in 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989). 
In Operative Directive 4.20 (1991), ¶¶ 4–5, the World Bank also addressed the question of who 
can be considered an indigenous people (i.e., “groups with a social and cultural identity distinct 
from the dominant society that makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the development 
process”). These “[i]ndigenous peoples can be identified in particular geographical areas by the 
presence in varying degrees of the following characteristics: (a) a close attachment to ancestral 
territories and to the natural resources in these areas; (b) self-identification and identification by 
others as members of a distinct cultural group; (c) an indigenous language, often different from 
the national language; (d) presence of customary social and political institutions; and (e) primarily 
subsistence-oriented production.” See ILO Convention 107, supra note 45.  
 92. The same approach has been used for minorities in the United Nations Declaration on 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities where the 
minorities are not defined. The latter was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992. See 
G.A. Res. 47/135 (18 Dec. 1992); see generally Patrick Thornberry, The UN Declaration: 
Background, Analysis and Observations, in THE UN MINORITY RIGHTS DECLARATION 11–71 (A. 
Phillips & A. Rosas eds., 1993).  
 93. Asbjorn Eide, The Indigenous Peoples, The Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of indigenous Peoples, in MAKING THE 
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the use of the term “people” or favored the narrowing of its meaning 
with the goal of preventing all possible appeal to the right of self-
determination, the indigenous peoples have consistently claimed that 
they have the same rights.94 By the end of the drafting process, African 
states, joined by some Asian states, generally favored the adoption of a 
definition in the Declaration, though they also noted either that they did 
not possess indigenous peoples or that all inhabitants could qualify as 
“indigenous peoples.”95 The strategy to include a definition of the 
beneficiaries in the Declaration in order to limit its application or to 
maintain that the question was foreign to Africa was, however, 
unsuccessful (see infra).96 From the beginning, the Working Group was 
supportive of the indigenous peoples’ demand: 
Indigenous groups are unquestionably “peoples” in every 
political, social, cultural and ethnological meaning of this term. They 
have their own specific languages, laws, values and traditions; their 
own long histories as distinct societies and nations; and a unique 
economic, religious and spiritual relationship with the territories in 
which they have lived. It is neither logical nor scientific to treat them 
as the same “peoples” as their neighbors, who obviously have 
different languages, histories and cultures.
 97
 
The United Nations should not pretend, for the sake of a convenient 
legal fiction, that those differences do not exist. Although it is missing a 
definition, the text of the Declaration endorses the idea of equality 
between indigenous peoples and other peoples: “indigenous peoples and 
individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals” in 
terms of dignity and rights.98 The concept of belonging to the group is 
individually determined, but must for obvious reasons, also be “in 
accordance with the traditions and customs of the community and 
nations concerned.”99 In other words, the individual belonging to a 
group, to a great extent, becomes a matter of personal choice as opposed 
to often-used theories where one’s belonging is pre-determined by 
 
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 32, 79 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).  
 94. Id. at 80.  
 95. African Group, Draft Aide Memoire on the U.N. Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Draft Aide Memoire]. See also Henriksen, supra 
note 88, at 79; Albert Barume, Responding to the Concerns of the African States, in MAKING THE 
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 170–72 (Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).  
 96. Eide, supra note 93, at 80; see Draft Aide Memoire.  
 97. U.N. Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1, ¶ 7 (July 
19, 1993) [hereinafter Prevention of Discrimination].  
 98. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, art. 2.  
 99. Id. art. 9.  
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alleged objective factors or imposed by law.100 The individual approach 
is further reflected in Articles 8 and 33 of the Declaration101 and 
confirmed in the report of Martinez Cobo, the Special Rapporteur on the 
study of discrimination against indigenous populations:  
On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who 
belongs to these indigenous populations through self-identification 
as indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized and accepted 
by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the 
group).  
This preserves for the communities the sovereign right and 
power to decide who belongs to them, without external 
interference.
102
 
When a definition of “indigenous peoples” is needed, reference is 
usually made to the now authoritative working definition elaborated by 
Martinez Cobo.103 For him, 
[i]ndigenous communities, peoples and nations are those 
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present 
non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, 
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, 
and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as 
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems. 
…. 
On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who 
belongs to these indigenous populations through self-identification 
as indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized and accepted 
by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the 
group).
104
  
The focus of the definition is the element of “historical continuity 
 
 100. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF. LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE 
AGES OF INDIVIDUALISM (1999).  
 101. Art. 8 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [hereinafter UNDRIP] 
refers to the “Indigenous peoples and individuals . . . right not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation or destruction of their culture” and Art. 33 UNDRIP states that “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs 
and traditions.” See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, arts. 8, 33.  
 102. Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (Vol. V), ¶¶ 381–82 (Mar. 1987) (by Jose R. Martinez 
Cobo) [hereinafter Study of the Problem of Discrimination].  
 103. Id.  
 104. Study of the Problem of Discrimination, supra note 102, ¶¶ 379–83.  
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with pre-invasion or pre-colonial societies.”105 Therefore, the crux of 
the question is who originally occupied the land or more bluntly, who 
was there first. In a situation of Western migration and overseas 
resettlement, a clear distinction can be made between “those who were 
there first” and “those who came later.”106 With respect to Africa, 
however, it makes less sense to speak of pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies because arguably, all African communities are to be 
characterized as both. The question would then turn to proving who is 
more indigenous/native than the other.107 Echoing this argument, in 
January 2007, the Assembly of the African Union affirmed that the vast 
majority of the peoples of Africa are indigenous to the African 
continent.108 Viljoen therefore argues that from an African perspective, 
there is a “need to refocus the term ‘indigenous’ to refer to 
‘marginality’, and ‘self-identification,’ rather than ‘priority of time.’”109 
This is a view also shared by the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. In its Advisory Opinion on the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, it rejected the view of 
the African states (which defended the need to have a definition in the 
UN Declaration) and pointed out that it was more appropriate to only 
define the main characteristics used to identify indigenous populations 
and communities in Africa.110 In particular (but not necessarily 
excluding other elements) the Commission suggested the following 
elements: 
a) Self-identification; 
b) A special attachment to and use of their traditional land whereby 
their ancestral land and territory have a fundamental importance for 
their collective physical and cultural survival as peoples; 
 
 105. Jose R. Martinez Cobo describes historic continuity as “the continuation of, for an 
extended period reaching into the present, one or more of the following factors: (a) Occupation of 
ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; (b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of 
these lands; (c) Culture in general, or specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a 
tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, 
etc.); (d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother tongue, as the habitual means 
of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal 
language); (e) Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world; (f) 
Other relevant factors.” Id.  
 106. Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic 
Revolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 60 INT’L & COMP. L. 
QUART. 245, 250 (2011).  
 107. Id. at 264.  
 108. Decision on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, AU 
Doc., Assembly/AU/Dec.141 (VIII),  ¶ 7 (Jan. 30, 2007) [hereinafter AU Doc. Assembly].  
 109. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 280–81 (2007).  
 110. Advisory Opinion on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, ACHPR, 41st Sess., at 30 (May 2007), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/special-
mechanisms/indigenous-populations/un_advisory_opinion_idp_eng.pdf [hereinafter ACHPR 
Advisory Opinion].  
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c) A state of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion, 
or discrimination because these peoples have different cultures, 
ways of life or mode of production than the national hegemonic and 
dominant model.
111
 
With one essential exception, this position is comparable to the 
viewpoint of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, which 
worked with a flexible combination of criteria to determine the 
indigenous quality of a population group.112 Five distinct criteria have 
been advanced by the Working Group to classify peoples as indigenous 
peoples: (1) traditional lands, (2) historical continuity, (3) distinct 
cultural characteristics, (4) non-dominance, and finally (5) self-
identification and group consciousness.113 On historical continuity, the 
African Commission has, for reasons explained above, a different view 
for the term indigenous populations. “[I]n Africa, the term indigenous 
populations does not mean ‘first inhabitants’ in reference to 
aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those having 
come from elsewhere.”114 This peculiarity distinguishes Africa from the 
other continents where native communities have been almost 
annihilated by non-native populations.115 With that view, the African 
Commission defended a view suggesting that any African can 
legitimately consider him/herself as an indigent on the Continent.116 In 
the Endorois case (see infra), however, the Commission had the 
opportunity to apply its view to a concrete situation for the first time 
and decided whether the Endorois community constituted a beneficiary 
of collective rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.117 In identifying criteria for “indigenousness,” it referred to 
occupation of territory, voluntary perpetuation of culture, self-
identification and recognition by other communities as indigenous.118 It 
is relevant to note that for the Commission, even if some of the 
community members have joined the mainstream, the community does 
not lose its indigenous nature.119 The question of the definition of 
indigenous peoples was also raised at the 2006 workshop in Yaoundé, 
which was co-organized by the ILO and the Working Group on 
 
 111. Id.  
 112. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Comm’n on H.R. Sub-Comm. on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1995/3 (1995).  
 113. Id. ¶¶ 12–18.  
 114. ACHPR Advisory Opinion, supra note 110, at 31.  
 115. Id. at 31.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, at 162.  
 119. Id. at 34–35.  
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Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa.120 Not surprisingly, the 
ILO and Working Group again recommended taking the peculiar 
situation of Africa into account, suggesting not to define indigenous 
people, but instead proposing a criteria, similar to those used by the 
African Commission, to identify the indigenous peoples.121  
Although it has been impossible for states to agree on an 
internationally accepted definition of what constitutes an indigenous 
community, one can fairly state that the criteria proposed by various 
actors involved in the debate are useful and sufficient. All criteria points 
to the same direction even though Africa focuses, for obvious reasons, 
less on historical continuity and more on marginalization. Whilst voices 
have been uttered to consider all Africans as being indigenous in 
practice, it is mainly the traditional communities of hunters-gathers and 
some pastoral and nomadic societies such as the pygmies in the forest 
areas, the San in Southern Africa, the Touareg in North-West Africa and 
those who continue to live at the margin of modern society, who are 
considered indigenous groups.122 
2.  The Right to Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples 
The controversy on the term “people” in the drafting process of the 
Declaration originates in the demand of indigenous peoples to be 
granted collective rights, particularly the right to self-determination.123 
Many countries expressed their reservations to recognizing collective 
rights in general and self-determination in particular.124 For instance, 
during the drafting process, France and Japan rejected the existence of 
collective rights.125 The United States proposed an approach close to 
what has been developed for minorities, namely individual rights to be 
 
 120. International Labour Organization, Report of the Workshop to Determine the Scope and 
Methodology of the Research (Jan. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Resources/Publications/WCMS_100797/lang--en/index.htm.  
 121. For the participants of the workshop, indigenous peoples are socially, culturally and 
economically distinct; their cultures and ways of life differ considerably from the dominant 
society and their cultures are often under threat, in some cases to the extent of extinction; they 
have a special attachment to their lands or territories because the survival of their particular way 
of life depends on access and rights to their traditional lands and the natural resources thereon; 
they suffer discrimination as they are regarded as “less developed” and “less advanced” than 
other more dominant sectors of society; the often live in inaccessible regions, often 
geographically isolated and are subjected to various forms of marginalization, both politically and 
socially; they are subject to domination and exploitation within national political and economic 
structures that are commonly designed to reflect the interests and activities of the national 
majority; they base themselves on self-identification, whereby the people themselves 
acknowledge their distinct cultural identity, way of life, and seek to perpetuate and retain their 
identity. Id. § 1.3.  
 122. Id. § 7.1.  
 123. ANAYA, supra note 53.  
 124. XANTHAKI, supra note 51, at 29–30.  
 125. Id. at 107.  
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exercised individually or in community with others.126 As for the U.K., 
“[w]ith the exception of the right to self-determination, the United 
Kingdom did not accept the concept of collective human rights in 
international law.”127 The right to self-determination nevertheless 
occupies a cardinal position in the Declaration.128 This again shows how 
effective the indigenous movement was in pushing its agenda into the 
negotiating room. In no other human rights instrument did the 
beneficiaries play such a prominent role in the drafting. 
The Declaration asserts that indigenous peoples enjoy all human 
rights, including the right to self-determination.129 Apart from the 
Preamble, Article 1 of the Declaration also affirms that indigenous 
peoples have the right to full and effective enjoyment of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by the UN and 
international law.130 Article 3 insists on the right to self-determination in 
language similar to that used in common Article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.131 This general 
pronouncement has to be read together with Articles 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 
and 34 in order to distill the meaning and content of indigenous self-
determination: 
Article 3: Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
Article 4: Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in 
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways 
and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
Article 5: Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and 
cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if 
they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of 
the State. 
…. 
 
 126. Id. at 31–32.  
 127. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration of Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007).  
 128. Id.  
 129. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, at 4.  
 130. Id. at 3.  
 131. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted as G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 
Annex (16 Dec. 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 1 at 173; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171; International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted as G.A. Res. 2200 
(XXI), Annex (16 Dec. 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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Article 18: Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in 
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through 
representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own 
procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous 
decision-making institutions. 
Article 19: States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative 
measures that may affect them. 
Article 20:  
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their 
political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in 
the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, 
and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic 
activities. 
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and 
development are entitled to just and fair redress. 
…. 
Article 34: Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop 
and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive 
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the 
cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance 
with international human rights standards.132 
Indigenous peoples, being considered as a particular kind of 
peoples, enjoy an equal status and the same rights as those conferred to 
peoples in general.133 Indigenous self-determination being built on the 
pronouncements of peoples’ self-determination “does not constitute a 
second class exercise or expression of the rights of peoples.”134 In an 
explanatory note to the Draft Declaration, Professor Daes, Chairperson-
Rapporteur of the Working Group, expounds the meaning ascribed to 
indigenous self-determination. She first examined the leading UN 
instruments on self-determination to conclude that:  
"self-determination" is a continuing dynamic right, in the 
sense that it can be reawakened if, at any moment, representative 
democracy fails and no alternatives exist for the defence of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
The concept of "self-determination" has accordingly taken on 
a new meaning in the post-colonial era. Ordinarily, it is the right of 
the citizens of an existing, independent State to share power 
democratically. However, a State may sometimes abuse this right of 
 
 132. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, at 3–4, 6–7, 9 (original formatting omitted). 
 133. ANAYA, supra note 53, at 190.  
 134. Prevention of Discrimination, supra note 97, at 3.  
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its citizens so grievously and irreparably that the situation is 
tantamount to classic colonialism, and may have the same legal 
consequences. The international community and the present writer 
discourage secession as a remedy for the abuse of fundamental 
rights, but, as recent events around the world demonstrate, secession 
cannot be ruled out completely in all cases. The preferred course of 
action, in every case except the most extreme ones, is to encourage 
the State in question to share power democratically with all groups, 
under a constitutional formula that guarantees that the Government 
is “effectively representative.”
135
 
Practice, however, has demonstrated that indigenous peoples have 
been marginalized politically and, except in a few cases, they seldom 
effectively participate in national decision-making nor have been 
engaged in the constitutional process of their state.  
With few exceptions, indigenous peoples were never a part of 
State-building. They did not have an opportunity to participate in 
designing the modern constitutions of the States in which they live, 
or to share, in any meaningful way, in national decision-making. In 
some countries they have been excluded by law or by force, but in 
many countries that they have been separated by language, poverty, 
misery, and the prejudices of their non-indigenous neighbours. 
Whatever the reason, indigenous peoples in most countries have 
never been, and are not now, full partners in the political process and 
lack others’ ability to use democratic means to defend their 
fundamental rights and freedoms.
136
 
This observation led to the growing consensus that the indigenous 
peoples’ fight for recognition of their right to self-determination is 
legitimate and legally acceptable.137 It is a right to participate in 
political, economic, social and cultural life of the state promoting “the 
negotiation of arrangements to strengthen states and make them truly 
representative, democratic, liberal and inclusive.”138 Indigenous peoples 
have overwhelmingly expressed their wish to participate in the decision-
making process within the confines of existing state boundaries.139 The 
fear that many states have when it comes to self-determination—that it 
would be used as a tool for the dismemberment of existing states—is 
exaggerated. Only in exceptional circumstances, when “the right to 
share power democratically would have been abused ‘grievously and 
irreparably,’”140 would it be legitimate to appeal to secessionist self-
 
 135. Id. at 4–5.  
 136. Id. at 5.  
 137. See id. at 5–6.  
 138. Id. at 6.  
 139. ANAYA, supra note 53, at 185, 188.  
 140. Catherine M. Brölmann & Marjoleine Zieck, Some Remarks on the Draft Declaration on 
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determination.141 Self-determination, instead of being seen exclusively 
as a means to gain sovereignty or an attribute of it, must rather be 
considered as an aspect of a human right with all its underpinning 
values and connotations. For Anaya this means that: 
[f]irst, self-determination is a right that inheres in human 
beings themselves, although collectively as “peoples” in the 
broadest sense of the term. Second, like all human rights, self-
determination derives from common conceptions about the essential 
nature of human beings, and it accordingly applies universally and 
equally to all segments of humanity. Third, as a human right, self-
determination cannot be viewed in isolation from other human 
rights norms but rather must be reconciled with and understood as 
part of the broader universe of values and prescriptions that 
constitute the modern human rights regime.
142
   
The Declaration innovates in a way to exercise self 
determination.143 Though autonomy or self-government is generally not 
considered a term of art in existing international law,144 and though it is 
rather a concept confined to domestic constitutional law, it is one of the 
pillars upon which the whole Declaration rests. Article 4 of the 
Declaration, quoted above, sets the general rule.145 Combined with 
other substantive articles (such as Arts. 4, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36), it 
gives the indigenous communities the right to govern their most 
essential matters autonomously.146 Said differently and compared to 
how (internal) self-determination has been interpreted by UN human 
rights treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee147 and the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,148 
 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 8 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 103, 107 (1995).  
 141. Id.  
 142. S. James Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post-
Declaration Era, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 184 (Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 
2009).  
 143. G.A. Res 61/295, supra note 2.  
 144. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 4 (1992).  
 145. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, art. 4.  
 146. Id. arts. 4, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.  
 147. Reference is made by the Human Rights Committee to self-determination as “a right 
belonging to all peoples to participate in their governance through democratic processes.” See  
U.N. H.R. Comm., Rep. of the Human Rights Committee 143, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984).  
 148. In its General Recommendation XXI the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination stated that “[i]n respect of the self-determination of peoples two aspects 
have to be distinguished. The right to self-determination of peoples has an internal aspect, i.e. the 
right of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development without 
outside interference. In that respect there exists a link with the right of every citizen to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs at any level as referred to in Article 5(c) of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In consequence, 
10/16/2013 10:58 AM   
514 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:493 
 
self-determination is more viewed as an instrument for self-rule rather 
than a means to achieve participation in the polite of the state. A similar 
view is defended by Brölman and Zieck: 
Although these [measures can] be interpreted as a means to ensure 
the national government is a ‘representative’ one, the participation 
envisaged seems predominantly geared to preserving indigenous 
autonomy. Indicative in this respect is that the gist of the 
participation of indigenous peoples in national affairs is confined to 
those instances where, without such participation, interference by 
the state in the ‘internal affairs’ of the indigenous community would 
be possible.
149
 
In essence, indigenous self-determination must be considered as a 
means to redress past marginalization in order to be able to fully exist 
and develop as a distinct group.150 This means that indigenous peoples 
must have all possibilities to participate in the decision-making process 
of the larger society in which it lives, but more importantly, it is also a 
right to an autonomous exercise of competences deemed necessary to 
protect the economic, social, and cultural distinctness. 
3.  The Right to Traditional Lands and Resources 
The bulk of UN practice on self-determination has mainly focused 
on the political dimension of the right even though the basic human 
rights instruments also refer to the right to freely pursue its own 
economic development.151 Although “economic self-determination” 
constitutes the natural counterpart of the political aspect of self-
determination, however, it has never received the same attention in the 
UN and other circles.152 It is, to quote Oloka-Onyango, “as if self-
determination has been shorn of all its economic elements and [has] 
become solely concerned with borders, territory, and nationalism.”153 
 
governments are to represent the whole population without distinction as to race, colour, descent, 
national, or ethnic origins. The external aspect of self-determination implies that all peoples have 
the right to determine freely their political status and their place in the international community 
based upon the principle of equal rights and exemplified by the liberation of peoples from 
colonialism and by the prohibition to subject peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and 
exploitation.” See Office of High Comm'r for H.R., Gen. Rec. No. 21: Right to Self-
determination, 1, U.N. Doc. CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3 (Aug. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Gen. Rec. No. 
21).  
 149. Brölmann & Zieck, supra note 140, at 106.  
 150. FELIX MUKWIZA NDAHINDA, INDIGENOUSNESS IN AFRICA: A CONTESTED LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR EMPOWERMENT OF ‘MARGINALIZED’ COMMUNITIES 143–44 (1st ed., 2011).  
 151. Alice Farmer, Toward a Meaningful Rebirth of Economic Self-Determination: Human 
Rights Realization in Resources-Rich Countries, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 417, 457 (2006).  
 152. See id. at 419.  
 153.  J. Oloka-Onyango, Heretical Reflection on the Right to Self-Determination: Prospects 
and Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
156 (1999).  
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Despite its codification as a distinct form of self-determination, the 
application of economic self-determination has mainly been approached 
from a state-centric perspective, considering the state rather than the 
people as the right holder.154 The indigenous claims to land and 
territories are closely linked to the economic aspect of self-
determination because without control of their traditional lands and 
natural resources, efforts to preserve indigenous distinctness will not 
bear fruit.155 The UNDRIP therefore refers to political as well as 
economic self-determination.156 Moreover, by devoting a number of 
provisions to indigenous peoples’ rights to their traditional lands, 
territories and resources, it obliges the analyst to pay more attention to 
an aspect that has greatly been neglected in the traditional self-
determination debate.157  
Traditional lands and resources have always been important for the 
survival of indigenous peoples.158 It was mentioned above that ILO 
Convention 169 was drafted to respond to the criticism uttered against 
its predecessor—criticism also related to the insufficient protection of 
land rights.159 Recognizing rights for indigenous peoples without 
regulating the land question is to a great extent meaningless.160 To quote 
Martinez Cobo,  
[i]t is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual 
special relationship between indigenous peoples and their land as 
basic to their existence as such and to all their beliefs, customs, 
traditions and culture . . . . Their land is not a commodity which can 
be acquired, but a material element to be enjoyed freely.
161
  
The UN has consistently, through its human rights bodies, 
acknowledged that to be effective, the indigenous peoples’ right to exist 
as a distinct cultural community must include rights over their 
traditional lands and resources.162 Another avenue that has frequently 
 
 154. Farmer, supra note 151, at 448.  
 155. Id. at 426.  
 156. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, ¶ 3.  
 157. International Work Group of Indigenous Affairs, Indigenous Peoples in Africa: The 
Forgotten Peoples?, ACHPR (2006), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/special-
mechanisms/indigenous-populations/achpr_wgip_report_summary_version_eng.pdf.  
 158. Id.  
 159. See id.  
 160. Study of the Problem of Discrimination, supra note 102.  
 161. Id. ¶ 197.  
 162. See UNESCO, UNESCO and Indigenous Peoples: Partnership to Promote Cultural 
Diversity (May 2006), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001356/135656M.pdf 
[hereinafter UNESCO Cultural Diversity].  Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous People, UN Docs E/CN.4/Sub.2/476, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21; Working Paper of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, Working Paper of the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, on the Concept of “Indigenous People”, UN Doc 
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been used by international and regional organizations to recognize land 
and resource rights to indigenous peoples is a non-discriminatory 
application of property rights, which would result in the state not 
necessarily “owning” indigenous land and resources.163 According to 
Mattias Ahren, “it is discriminatory to design a domestic legal system in 
such a way that stationary land use common to the non-indigenous 
population results in rights to [land, territory, and resource right] 
whereas more fluctuating use of land, common in many indigenous 
cultures, does not.”164 The legal system must not only be formally 
nondiscriminatory, “it must also guarantee equal treatment in 
substance.”165 
The controversy regarding indigenous peoples’ rights to their land 
and natural resources remains, however, heavily contested; and the 
UNDRIP fails to fully clarify the position of international law in this 
regard.166 The negotiations of the land and resources provision of the 
Declaration were extremely difficult167 and delayed the adoption of the 
Declaration until the end. The dependence on lands and resources for 
indigenous peoples’ survival is recognized in the preamble of the 
Declaration (in recital 6) and various provisions specify the content of 
indigenous peoples’ land and resource rights.168 The most important 
provisions are the following: 
Article 25:  
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal 
seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to 
future generations in this regard. 
Article 26:  
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired. 
2.  Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and 
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by 
reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or 
 
/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes).  
 163. See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
204 (ser. E) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007).  
 164. Mattias Ahren, The Provisions on Lands, Territories and Natural Resources in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Introduction, in MAKING THE 
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).  
 165. Id.  
 166. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 21.  
 167. Ahren, supra note 164, at 205–09.  
 168. Similar but less far-reaching and less detailed provisions are found in Articles 13, 14 and 
15 of ILO Convention 169.  
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use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, 
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with 
due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the 
indigenous peoples concerned. 
. . . . 
Article 28:  
1.  Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can 
include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and 
equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources 
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, 
and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged 
without their free, prior and informed consent. 
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, 
compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources 
equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation 
or other appropriate redress.169 
 The first provision recognizes the special (spiritual) relationship 
between indigenous peoples and their traditional lands.170 One could 
argue that this is more a general statement without far-reaching legal 
consequences. The two latter provisions are much more significant in 
terms of law and corresponding state obligations.171 They stipulate that 
indigenous peoples have a right of ownership over these lands and 
resources, and that they consequently have a right to control and decide 
how to use and develop them.172 Ownership should not be construed in 
its traditional Western view of property rights but more in the sense of 
custody and usufructs of something belonging collectively to past, 
present and future generations. According to the International Law 
Association, land rights are not aimed at safeguarding “property rights,” 
i.e., an exclusive absolute right to use, enjoy and dispose of a thing (uti, 
frui, fui)—which according to the Western world, has an economic 
connotation—but rather as a prerogative with a primarily spiritual, i.e., 
cultural, purpose.173 In other words, the right is functional to the 
safeguarding—through ensuring the maintenance of the special link 
between indigenous peoples and their Motherland—of the very distinct 
cultural identity of indigenous peoples as well as of their ability to 
survive and flourish as different human communities.174 
What is important is whether the traditional land and resources 
 
 169. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, at 7–8 (original formatting omitted).  
 170. Id. at 10.  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89.  
  174. Id. at 12.  
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have been in “use” by indigenous peoples rather than “owned” by them. 
In situations where they have lost their land and resources without 
consent, indigenous peoples have a right to redress preferably via 
restitution or alternatively via fair and equitable compensation.175 
Compared to ILO Convention 169, the Declaration constitutes an 
important improvement for indigenous peoples because, besides 
restating what was already recognized in that convention, it refers for 
the first time to the right over traditional lands and resources they have 
been deprived of.176 This right of restitution, however, could be 
construed on the basis of universal and regional human rights 
instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
For example, in General Recommendation XXIII on indigenous 
peoples, the Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
stipulated that: 
5. The Committee especially calls upon States parties to recognize 
and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, 
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources and, 
where they have been deprived of their lands and territories 
traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their free 
and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and 
territories. Only when this is for factual reasons not possible, the 
right to restitution should be substituted by the right to just, fair and 
prompt compensation. Such compensation should as far as possible 
take the form of lands and territories.
177
 
Although the consensus around rights to traditional lands and 
resources was hard to reach for political and financial reasons, the 
Declaration mainly codifies existing rules on the issue.178 This view, 
combined with the growing recent state practice, has shown that land 
rights, although not fully crystallized, have entered the domain of 
customary international law.179  
It is relevant to note that even though the Declaration recognizes 
that indigenous peoples possess extended land rights, it remains silent 
 
 175. G.A. Res 61/295, supra note 2, ¶ 28.  
 176. Ahren, supra note 164, at 212.  
 177. CERD, General Recommendation XXIII, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 55th sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/52/18, annex V at 122 (1997), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 213 (2003).  
 178. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx.; Ahren, supra note 164, at 
213.  
 179. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 23.  
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when it comes to defining the concept of traditional lands.180 As will be 
shown below, the regional human rights systems currently involved 
with indigenous peoples’ rights have been able to define the concept in 
such a way that it becomes very significant for indigenous peoples. 
4.  The legal value of the UNDRIP 
The UNDRIP has been adopted as a resolution of the UN General 
Assembly and has therefore, legally speaking, only the status of a 
recommendation.181 There is, however, a growing understanding that 
the Declaration (if not all provisions, at least some of them) can be 
considered as declaratory of customary international law182 or “‘an 
authoritative statement of norms concerning indigenous peoples on the 
basis of generally applicable human rights principles.’”183 Not only did 
the drafting process mirror that of an international treaty, it was also 
adopted by a significant majority of 143, 4 against, and with 11 
abstentions.184 States, which voted against the Declaration, have 
recently declared a willingness/readiness to endorse the Declaration.185 
Practice on indigenous peoples’ rights is growing at the regional and 
state levels.186 This has prompted the ILA to conclude that it can now be 
considered as a reflection of customary international law.187 It is 
relevant to note that the African Commission, in its first decision on 
indigenous peoples’ rights extensively quoted the UN Declaration, 
thereby showing that it considered it to possess an opinio juris 
character.188 
IV.  AFRICAN REGIONAL PRACTICE 
A.  The emergence of an indigenous friendly interpretation  
of the African human rights instruments 
The recognition of indigenous peoples as holders of specific 
human rights in Africa is of very recent date and is mainly due to 
ground work done by international NGOs therein, followed by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
 
 180. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 20–21; G.A. Res 
61/295, supra note 2, at 10.  
 181. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 5.  
 182. S. Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1176 (2008).  
  183. XANTHAKI, supra note 51, at 120.  
 184. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 4–5.  
 185. Id. at 5.  
 186. Id. at 47, 49.  
 187. Id. at 6.  
 188. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5.  
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Commission).189 The origin of Africa’s involvement with indigenous 
peoples’ rights can be traced back to an international conference on 
indigenous peoples in Africa organized by the International Work 
Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) in Arusha in 1999.190 The 
conference was attended by the African Commissioner Pityana who 
encouraged “the African Commission . . . to address the human rights 
situation of indigenous peoples in Africa, which it had so far never done 
before.”191 Initially, however, the African Commission opposed the idea 
to consider any issue relating to indigenous peoples; however, already 
one year after the conference it decided to put the question of 
indigenous peoples on its agenda as a specific item of interest. This 
encouraged both the Commission and indigenous peoples’ organizations 
to pursue the matter further.192 In 2000, a Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities (Working Group) was set up by the African 
Commission with a mandate to “[e]xamine the concept of indigenous 
peoples and communities in Africa; Study the implications of the 
ACHPR and well being of indigenous communities; Consider 
appropriate recommendations for the monitoring and protection of the 
rights of indigenous communities; and Submit a report to the African 
Commission.”193 
Between 2000 and 2003, the Working Group, in consultation with 
human rights experts and representatives of indigenous communities, 
drafted a comprehensive report on the situation of indigenous peoples in 
Africa, which was adopted by the African Commission in November 
2003.194 It confirmed the existence of indigenous populations while also 
proposing possible criteria for identifying these population groups in 
Africa.195 This had been an actual concern, as African governments 
were often reluctant to recognize the existence of indigenous 
communities in Africa for fear of exacerbating tensions between ethnic 
 
 189. Frans Viljoen, Reflections on the Legal Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in 
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groups and also because it was believed that their legal recognition 
could threaten the territorial integrity of states.196 A further argument 
advanced was that all Africans are indigenous to the continent and 
therefore the concept might not be suitable for African situations.197 The 
report also specified the human rights of indigenous peoples and 
referred to related issues of concern.198 To specify the human rights of 
indigenous peoples, reference was made to individual and collective 
rights referred to in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
which were analyzed in light of the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission.199 Interestingly, the report referred to the fact that people 
were not defined in the Charter, and used that fact to defend a very 
progressive stance—that the ACHPR peoples’ rights provisions were 
equally relevant for “a section of the population” such as minority and 
indigenous populations.200 Describing human rights violations 
undergone by indigenous peoples, the report inter alia, emphasized the 
violations of land and natural resources.201 In the words of the report, 
Dispossession of land and natural resources is a major human 
rights problem for indigenous peoples. They have in so many cases 
been pushed out of their traditional areas to give way for the 
economic interests of other more dominant groups and large-scale 
development initiatives that tend to destroy their lives and cultures 
rather than improve their situation. The establishment of protected 
areas and national parks has impoverished indigenous pastoralist 
and hunter-gatherer communities . . . . Large-scale extraction of 
natural resources such as logging, mining, dam construction, oil 
drilling and pipeline construction have had very negative impacts . . 
. . So has the widespread expansion of areas under crop production. 
They have all resulted in loss of access to fundamental natural 
resources that are critical for the survival of both pastoral and 
hunter-gatherer communities such as grazing areas, permanent 
water sources and forest products.
202
 
These examples are considered by the report to be violations of 
Articles 20, 21, 22, and 24 of the ACHPR.203 These rights clearly 
suggest that the drafters of the report believe that indigenous peoples 
possess expansive land and resource rights under the African human 
rights system.204 This is contrary to the traditional state-centric 
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approach, which confers ownership rights to land and natural resources 
to the governments.205 The report also manifested its concern regarding 
customary rights of indigenous peoples and recommended that states 
recognize and protect these rights as they are central to indigenous 
survival.206 
The mandate of the Working Group has been successively 
prolonged, but in 2007, following the African Union decision to defer 
the adoption of the UN Declaration in the UN General Assembly, the 
Working Group proceeded to draft the Commission’s Advisory Opinion 
on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.207 In the 2007 Advisory Opinion, the Commission made an 
effort to convince the African states of the necessity to protect 
indigenous rights by responding to the African states' skepticism with 
respect to the draft UN Declaration.208 Because of the strong opposition 
of African states, the arguments put forth by the Commission in the 
Advisory Opinion proved crucial to change the position of African 
states in the UN.209 The Advisory Opinion referred to the Commission’s 
previous report on indigenous peoples and argued that indigenous 
peoples should be understood differently because “in Africa, the term 
indigenous populations does not mean ‘first inhabitants’ in reference to 
aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those having 
come from elsewhere.”210 As to the content of the rights recognized in 
the draft UN Declaration, the African Commission tried to persuade the 
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the UN Declaration. In January 2007 the AU Assembly welcomed the deferral of the adoption of 
the draft UN Declaration and mandated the African Group of states at the UN to guard Africa’s 
interests and concerns in this debate. The concerns of the AU mainly focused on the definition of 
indigenous peoples; the reference to a right to self-determination; ownership of land and 
resources; the establishment of political and economic institutions; and the destabilizing effect it 
could have on national and territorial integrity); see also Rachel Murray, The UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa: The Approach of the Regional Organisations to 
Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 485–505 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011).  
 208. ACHPR Advisory Opinion, supra note 110.  
 209. See Rachel Murray, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
Africa:TRhe Approach of the Regional Organisations to Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON 
THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 485–505 (Stephen Allen & 
Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011) (stating that prior to the Advisory Opinion little consideration 
was given to the Commissions’ and the Working Groups’ view on indigenous peoples by the AU 
and its member states. For example, when it came to consider the draft UN Declaration at the UN 
and later within the AU, African states and the AU main organs made no reference to the work of 
the African Commission and Working Group on indigenous peoples); see also ACHPR Advisory 
Opinion, supra note 110.  
 210. ACHPR Advisory Opinion, supra note 110, ¶ 13.  
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African states that they largely correspond to human rights standards 
already existing at the African continent.211 For example, on the issue of 
land rights, the Advisory Opinion emphasized that the Declaration’s 
provisions were similar to those found in instruments already adopted 
by the AU.212 For example,  
the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources whose major objective is: “to harness the natural and 
human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our 
peoples in spheres of human endeavor” (preamble) and which is 
intended “to preserve the traditional rights and property of local 
communities and request the prior consent of the communities 
concerned in respect of . . . their . . . traditional knowledge.”
213
 
Similarly, with regard to the right of self-determination, the 
Advisory Opinion stated that: 
Article 46 of the Declaration . . . is in conformity with the African 
Commission’s jurisprudence on the promotion and protection of the 
rights of indigenous populations based on respect of sovereignty, 
the inviolability of the borders acquired at independence of the 
member states and respect for their territorial integrity . . . .   
. . . .  
[T]he notion of self-determination has evolved with the development 
of the international visibility of the claims made by indigenous 
populations whose right to self-determination is exercised within the 
standards and according to the modalities which are compatible with 
the territorial integrity of the Nation States to which they belong.
214
 
In doing so, the Advisory Opinion has undoubtedly contributed to 
countering the reluctance of the African states so that the UNDRIP 
could be adopted by an overwhelming majority.215 The role of the 
African Commission in favor of indigenous rights protection has, thus, 
been both valuable at the international and regional level.216 On one 
hand, it has participated in “reconnecting” the African continent with 
the developments taking place at the international level;217 and on the 
other hand, it has increased awareness of the human rights violations 
suffered by indigenous peoples in Africa, as well as the need to address 
them on the basis of both the individual and collective rights provisions 
 
 211. Advisory Opinion of the African Comm. on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, African Comm. on Human & Peoples’ Rights, 
Rep. on its 41st Sess. (2007).  
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. ¶ 35.  
 214. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22 (emphasis omitted).  
 215. See also Gilbert, supra note 35, at 247.  
 216. Id.  
 217. Id.  
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of the ACHPR.218 
 
B.  The Implementation of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights  
to Land and Resources: From Theory to Practice 
1.  Regional practice 
The African Commission played an important role in convincing 
African states of the need to address the situation of indigenous 
peoples.219 When acting as an implementation organ of the ACHPR, it 
complemented this advocacy work by showing its commitment to 
giving its work practical meaning. In both state reporting as well as 
individual communication procedures, the Commission has increasingly 
drawn attention to issues regarding indigenous peoples. Although the 
1991 Commission Guidelines for state reporting recommended states to 
indicate the measures taken to promote the cultural heritage of “national 
ethnic groups and minorities and of indigenous sectors” of society,220 it 
is only since 2002, with the establishment of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities, that the Commission has started 
to effectively pose questions on the situation of indigenous peoples in 
the states under scrutiny.221  
The same openness to indigenous peoples’ demands can be 
perceived in the individual communication mechanism. In a small 
number of cases, the African Commission was able to clarify the 
collective rights recognized in the ACHPR.222 At the beginning, 
however, the peoples’ rights were interpreted in such a way that it was 
not fully clear whether it applied to other collectivities or to the entire 
 
 218. Id.  
 219. ACHPR Res. 51, supra note 193.  
 220. Afr. Charter, Guidelines for Nat’l Periodic Reps., ¶ III(14)(b)(iv), available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/theme02/african_commission_resolution_
13.pdf.  
 221. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) on the Initial Rep. of Kenya, 41st Sess., May 16–30, 2007, available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/kenya/kenya_concluding_observations_20
07.pdf; Concluding Observations of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) 
on S. Afr. Periodic Rep., 38th Sess., Nov. 21–Dec. 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/southafrica/southafrica_concluding_obser
vations_periodic_report_2005.pdf; Supp. Rep. on the Inaugural Rep. of Uganda to the Afr. 
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), May 2006, available at 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/theme02/uganda_shadow_report_indigeno
us_peoples_2006_a.pdf.  
 222.  Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire (2000) AHRLR 72 (ACHPR 1995); Malawi 
African Association and Others v. Mauritania (2000) AHRLR 149 (ACHPR 2000); Legal 
Resources Foundation v. Zambia, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. 
No. 211/98 (2001).  
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state population.223  
In 2001, a decision was handed out by the African Commission 
that has been described as an important victory for those defending 
minority rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights in 
Africa.224 In the Ogoni case, the African Commission found that the 
killings and destruction by Nigerian governmental forces and agents of 
the state-controlled oil company in Ogoniland had violated the right to 
life and dignity, the right to health, the right to property, the rights to 
shelter and food, and the right to economic, social and cultural 
development of the Ogoni.225 Although the case was not explicitly 
approached as an indigenous peoples’ question, the case seemed 
relevant for indigenous peoples for two reasons: first, the 
communication has largely inspired the Working Group to describe 
indigenous peoples’ rights; and second, it has paved the way for the 
development of a more significant implementation of indigenous rights 
in Africa. With the Ogoni case the Commission opened a door to a 
progressive interpretation of the beneficiaries of peoples’ rights.226 
Despite the lack of express recognition of the Ogoni community as an 
indigenous people, the Commission’s decision to approach the rights of 
the Ogoni people collectively demonstrates that the decision created the 
implication that the Ogoni were a people.227 In addition, the 
Commission argued that “the African Charter, in Articles 20 through 
24, clearly provides for peoples to retain rights as peoples, that is, as 
“collectives” and that “the importance of community and collective 
identity in African culture is recognized throughout the African 
Charter.”228 Thus, it could be implicitly inferred from the decision that 
the provisions on people’s rights were applicable to minorities as well 
as to indigenous peoples. The second element of relevance for 
indigenous peoples in the Ogoni case is the express acknowledgment by 
the Commission that “with regard to a collective group, the resources 
belonging to it should be respected, as it has to use the same resources 
 
 223. Id.  
 224. Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Self-Determination v. State Sovereignty: A Critique of the 
Afr. Comm’n Decision in the Ogoni Case, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
303 (Josh Castellino and Niamh Walsh eds., 2005).  
 225. The complaint was lodged by two NGOs in 1996 alleging human rights violations 
perpetrated by the Nigerian government against the Ogoni people. The Ogoni inhabit the Niger 
Delta where important oil reserves are exploited since the 1950s. Nigeria was accused of being 
directly involved in the development of oil activities, which led to massive environmental 
degradation, widespread contamination of Ogoniland and resulted in the death of numerous 
members of the community. See The Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Center for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Report 
No. 155/96  at 60, 68, 69, 72 (2001) [hereinafter Ogoni Case].  
 226. Bojosi, supra note 191, at 400–05.  
 227. Id. at 404.  
 228. Ogoni Case, supra note 225, ¶ 40.  
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to satisfy its needs.”229 For the Commission, the right to property 
“includes not only the right to have access to one’s property and not to 
have one’s property invaded or encroached upon, but also the right to 
undisturbed possession, use and control of such property however the 
owners deem fit.”230 This statement is of great significance to the land 
and resources rights of indigenous peoples as it sets a specific standard 
that can be applied to all kinds of peoples.231  
Following the Ogoni case, several communications were brought 
to the attention of the African Commission, but none of these cases 
reached the merits stage232 until the Endorois case was decided on the 
merits in 2009.233 In the landmark Endorois case concerning indigenous 
peoples, the African Commission found that the Kenyan government’s 
eviction of the Endorois people from their ancestral lands amounted to 
several violations of the ACHPR, in particular Articles 8, 14, 17, 21, 
and 22.234 Further, the African Commission recommended restitution of 
their traditional lands, recognition of their ownership rights, and 
compensation for harm suffered during the displacement.235  
In the 1970s the government of Kenya created the Lake 
Hannington and the Lake Bogoria Game Reserves on the ancestral 
territories of the Endorois community and relocated them to areas 
claimed to be unsuitable for their pastoral way of life.236 The Endorois 
were only sporadically allowed to visit sites associated with their 
spiritual belief, and the promised compensation and share of income 
from the game reserves and exploitation of precious gems found on 
their lands never materialized.237 The complaint on behalf of the 
 
 229. Id. ¶ 45.  
 230. See e.g., Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania (2000) AHRLR 149 
(ACHPR 2000).  
 231. In the complaint led by the Endorois people to the African Commission (see infra), 
multiple references to the Ogoniland case were made by the Endorois indigenous community to 
sustain its claims. See George Mukundi Wachira, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Land and 
Natural Resources in Africa, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES IN AFRICA (Solomon Dersso ed., 2010).  
 232. Bakweri Land Claims Committee v. Cameroon (2004) AHRLR 43 (ACHPR 2004).  
 233. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 162.  
 234. These are respectively the provisions on the right to religion, to property, the right to 
cultural identity, to land and natural resources and the right to development. See id. ¶ 22.  
 235. Id. The African Commission recommended that Kenya: (a) Recognise rights of 
ownership to the Endorois and Restitute Endorois ancestral land; (b) Ensure that the Endorois 
community has unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria and surrounding sites for religious and 
cultural rites and for grazing their cattle; (c) Pay adequate compensation to the community for all 
the loss suffered; (d) Pay royalties to the Endorois from existing economic activities and ensure 
that they benefit from employment possibilities within the Reserve; (e) Grant registration to the 
Endorois Welfare Committee; (f) Engage in dialogue with the Complainants for the effective 
implementation of these recommendations; and (g) Report on the implementation of these 
recommendations within three months from the date of notification. Id. at 8.  
 236. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 220.  
 237. Id. ¶¶ 80, 112, 124.  
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Endorois alleged that the government of Kenya, in creating those 
reserves, forcibly removed the community from their lands without 
proper prior consultations or adequate and effective compensation.238 
Not only were the Endorois deprived of a share of the income their land 
generated, but they were also prohibited from enjoying the resources 
produced by their land.239 
On many accounts, the decision innovates, but that should not be 
surprising taking into account the progressive stance the African 
Commission had recently taken in indigenous peoples’ matters.240 It is 
beyond the scope of this contribution to analyze each violation and we 
will—taking into account the scope of it—limit ourselves to property 
and natural resources rights.241  
The Commission agreed with the complainants that the contested 
lands were traditional lands of the Endorois community.242 The 
Commission referred to the fact that the Endorois had lived in the Lake 
Bogoria area from time immemorial, constructed homes on the land, 
cultivated the land, enjoyed unchallenged rights to pasture, graze, and 
forest land, and relied on the land to sustain their livelihood:243 
apart from a confrontation with the Masai over the Lake Bogoria 
region three hundred years ago, the Endorois have been accepted by 
all neighbouring tribes, including the British Crown, as bona fide 
owners of their land. The Respondent State does not challenge those 
statements of the Complainants.
244
 
The criteria defining traditional lands are the centuries of 
uncontested occupation and use prior to the eviction.245 Knowing that 
many pastoral but also other traditional societies in Africa claim that 
type of relationship with their land, this position of the African 
Commission has the potential to turn the accepted view on land 
property/ownership upside down. Having acknowledged that customary 
rights and effective occupation over ancestral lands constitute property 
under the African Charter, the Commission could then give its view on 
the nature of property rights taking into account “the informal, 
unwritten nature of such rights and the vulnerability this gives rise to in 
 
 238. Id. ¶ 2.  
 239. Id. ¶ 124.  
 240. See ACHPR Advisory Opinion, supra note 110, at 9.  
 241. It is, for example, the first time that an international human rights treaty implementation 
body gave its view on the right to development.  
 242. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 184; Rhodri C. Williams, African 
Commission 'Endorois Case'-Toward a Global Doctrine of  Customary Tenure?, TERRANULLIUS 
(Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://terra0nullius.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/the-african-
commission-endorois-case-toward-a-global-doctrine-of-customary-tenure/.  
 243. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 184.  
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. ¶ 150.  
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cases where they are not given some degree of formal recognition.”246 
To that end the Commission not only draws on its prior jurisprudence, 
but also refers to the case law of the European Court on Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.247  Even in the absence 
of formal title, someone may exercise property rights in the meaning of 
undisturbed possession, use, and control. It may also include broader 
interests and assets. For the Commission, Kenya “has a duty to 
recognise the right to property of members of the Endorois community, 
within the framework of a communal property system, and establish the 
mechanisms necessary to give domestic legal effect to such right 
recognised in the Charter and international law.”248 Thus, for the 
Commission, mere access to Lake Bogoria was insufficient because 
“only de jure ownership can guarantee indigenous peoples’ effective 
protection.”249 
“The African Commission notes that if international law were to 
grant access only, indigenous peoples would remain vulnerable to 
further violations/dispossession by the State or third parties. Ownership 
ensures that indigenous peoples can engage with the state and third 
parties as active stakeholders rather than as passive beneficiaries.”250 
This means that in order for the indigenous group to exercise their right 
to “use and enjoyment,” the respondent state must grant them title to 
their territory. Those rules are of practical interest in matters of land 
grabbing, and provide indigenous peoples a clear base upon which they 
can claim their right to property and contest the impact of large scale 
land acquisitions taking place without prior consent.  
The right to property is, however, not an absolute one. It is thus 
possible for the government to justify the eviction of a community 
based upon public interest purposes on the condition that it is also in 
accordance with the law.251 Both requirements are cumulative.252 
Regarding the justification for public interest, the African Commission 
took the view that a much higher threshold needs to be used in case of 
encroachment of indigenous land compared to individual private 
property.253 It therefore found inspiration in a statement of the UN 
Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which remarked that:  
[l]imitations, if any, on the right to indigenous peoples to their 
 
 246. See id. ¶ 187.  
 247. Id. ¶¶ 186–90.  
 248. Id. ¶ 196.  
 249. Id. ¶ 205.  
 250. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 204.  
 251. Id. ¶ 211.  
 252. Id.  
 253. Id. ¶ 212.  
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natural resources must flow from the most urgent and compelling 
interest of the state. Few, if any, limitations on indigenous resource 
rights are appropriate, because the indigenous ownership of the 
resources is associated with the most important and fundamental 
human rights, including the right to life, food, the right to self-
determination, to shelter, and the right to exist as a people.
254
 
Because land is essential to the survival of indigenous peoples, 
another threshold must be applied. Having defended this view, the 
Commission comes to the “view that the upheaval and displacement of 
the Endorois from the land they call home and the denial of their 
property rights over their ancestral land is disproportionate to any public 
need served by the Game Reserve.”255 Regarding the second 
justification, the Commission argued that law refers to national and 
international law.256 After analyzing Kenyan applicable law, it also 
referred to the requirements of consultation and compensation found in 
the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.257 In 
the Saramaka case, the Inter-American Court developed three 
safeguards regarding consultation and compensation.258 The state must: 
first, ensure the effective participation of the members of the 
[indigenous] people, in conformity with their customs and 
traditions, regarding any development, investment, exploration or 
extraction plan within [the territory of the indigenous people]; 
second, guarantee that the [indigenous people] will receive a 
reasonable benefit from any such plan within their territory; [and] 
third, ensure that no concession will be issued within the 
[indigenous peoples’] territory unless and until independent and 
technically capable entities, with the State’s supervision, perform a 
prior environmental and social impact assessment.
259
 
“In terms of consultation, the threshold is especially stringent in 
favor of indigenous peoples, as it also requires that consent be accorded. 
Failure to observe the obligations to consult and to seek consent - or to 
compensate - ultimately results in a violation of the right to property.”260 
Again, according to the Commission, these safeguards are intended to 
preserve, protect and guarantee the special relationship that the 
members of the indigenous people have with their territory, which in 
 
 254. Erica-Irène A. Daes, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Land and Natural Resources, in 
MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PATRICK 
THORNBERRY 89 (Nazila Ghanea-Hercock & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005) (emphasis added).  
 255. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 214.  
 256. Id. ¶ 219.  
 257. Id.  
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. ¶ 227. The criteria were originally developed by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, supra note 163.  
 260. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 226 (emphasis omitted).  
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turn ensures their survival as a tribal people.261 The Commission came 
to the conclusion that no effective participation of the Endorois had 
been sought and that they had been barred from the benefits of the game 
reserve.262 As to the question of compensation, the Commission used 
the national and international standards to conclude that no 
compensation was given.263 As the property of the Endorois has 
severely been encroached upon and as this encroachment was not 
proportional to any public need and was not in accordance with national 
and international law, the fact proved to be a violation of the right to 
property protected under Article 14 of the ACHPR.264  
In addition to the right to property, indigenous people might also 
seek to protect their natural resources. The right to natural resources is 
expressly protected under Article 21 of the African Charter.265 The 
African Commission, after analyzing the case law of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in the Saramaka case, found that the Endorois 
have, under the ACHPR, the right to freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources in consultation with the state, and in cases of violation 
by spoliation, restitution, and compensation must be provided.266 As the 
Endorois have neither received compensation nor restitution of their 
land, the facts indicate a violation of the right to resources recognized in 
Article 21 of the ACHPR.267 
With the Endorois case the African Commission extended the 
application of the African Charter to an indigenous people for the first 
time.268 The decision is important because the express recognition of the 
Endorois as an indigenous people completes the process initiated a 
decade ago at the Arusha conference.269  With its bold description of 
traditional lands and the property rights over land and resources, the 
decision also provides practical and precise guidance with regard to the 
protection of indigenous rights, and recommends reparative measures 
that should be granted to indigenous community whose rights have been 
infringed upon. 
 
 261. Id. ¶ 227.  
 262. Id. ¶ 228.  
 263. Id. ¶¶ 229–37.  
 264. Id. ¶ 238.  
 265. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 
I.L.M. 58, art. 21 (June 27, 1981) [hereinafter African Charter].  
 266. Gabrielle Lynch, Becoming Indigenous in the Pursuit of Justice: the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’, Rights and the Endorois, 111 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 24–45, 39 
(2012).  
 267. Id. at 40.  
 268. See id. at 26.  
 269. See Becoming Indigenous in the Pursuit of Justice, supra note 266.  
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2.  National practice 
It has been shown that indigenous peoples are quickly being 
recognized by the African human rights machinery as beneficiaries of 
human rights and that the African Commission has been willing to 
move forward on the engaged path in its application of the ACHPR.270 
This growing receptiveness to indigenous peoples’ rights is also 
perceivable in African national practice. Timid steps are made by 
African countries to adapt the constitutional framework to this new 
context.271 Without mentioning indigenous communities’ expressis 
verbis, some constitutions, such as the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, 
reserve a number of seats in parliament for vulnerable groups or special 
interest groups.272 These groups are often indigenous communities. The 
2005 Burundian Constitution even expressly mentions that three 
members of the National Assembly must be co-opted from the Twa 
indigenous community.273 The South African Constitution in turn 
explicitly protects indigenous languages.274 While some African states 
have thus recognized indigenous communities, with regard to the right 
to traditional lands and resources, the situation still remains far from 
satisfactory for indigenous peoples and the progressive stand of the 
African Commission has not (yet) been echoed in national practice; 
African states have in general not changed their approach to who owns 
the land and its resources.275 This is attested by the research finding of 
the co-sponsored ILO-African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights project examining constitutional, legislative and administrative 
provisions concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in Africa.276  
 
 270. Id. at 37.  
 271. See CONSTITUTION, art. 97 (2010) (Kenya).  
 272. Id.  
 273. La Constitution De la Republique Du Burundi [Constitution of the Republic of Burundi] 
2005, art. 164 (stating that “l’Assemblée nationale est composée d’au moins cent députés … 
[dont] trois députés issus de l’ethnie Twa cooptés conformément au code electoral”).  
 274. S. AFR. CONST., sec. 6(2), 1996. (recognizing that “the historically diminished use and 
status of the indigenous languages of [the country’s] people”  imposes upon “the state [to] take 
practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages”).  
 275. See Int. Labor Org. (ILO) and Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 
Examining Constitutional, Legislative and Administrative Provisions Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in AFRICA, WORKSHOP REP. (2009), at 12–15.  
 276. The report of the workshop concludes that indigenous peoples are unable to obtain 
recognition of their ownership rights in their traditional territories with the consequence that 
states often assert ownership over territories, and may sell those rights to third parties. Even when 
indigenous peoples have ownership rights to surface territory, the state generally holds the rights 
to subsurface resources. There is often no framework in place to ensure respect for indigenous 
peoples’ right to use and control their territories when the state or third parties exploit those 
resources. When the state carries out development activities in indigenous peoples’ traditional 
territories, or licenses third parties to do so, the community that is disadvantaged often receives 
little or no benefit. In more extreme cases, the exploitation of natural resources on indigenous 
lands has lead to severe environmental degradation with devastating long-term effects. There is 
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An exception is “Law 5-2011 on the promotion and protection of 
indigenous populations,” adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of 
Congo in December 2010 and promulgated by the President on 25 
February 2011.277 The law, which is the first on the continent to really 
address indigenous issues comprehensively, aims to respond to the 
discrimination and marginalization of indigenous groups generally 
known under the term “pygmies” and representing between 1.4-10% of 
the total population of the Republic.278 The legislative initiative, having 
been taken at the time when the UN (draft) Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples entered its final phase, the latter clearly inspired the 
drafters of the law.279 One can therefore speak about the law as 
implementing the UNDRIP in the national framework.280 As the 
UNDRIP, the Congolese law recognizes a whole list of (human) rights 
to be exercised individually or collectively by the indigenous group.281 
Reference is made to civil and political rights such as equality and non-
discrimination (Art. 2), the right to be consulted and to participate in the 
decision making process when it directly or indirectly affects them (Art. 
3), the right of marriage and inheritance in accordance with traditional 
practices (Art. 5), access to justice (Art. 10) and the right to recourse to 
their own customs for the resolution of conflicts (Art. 11), various 
cultural rights (Arts. 13-16), the right to education (Arts. 17-21), the 
right to health (Arts. 22-25), labor rights (Arts. 26-30), and the right to a 
healthy environment (Art. 43).282 An important section of the law is 
devoted to property rights and the rights of ownership over traditional 
lands and resources.283According to the law, indigenous peoples have a 
right (to be exercised collectively and individually) “to own, possess, 
access and use the lands and natural resources they have traditionally 
used or occupied for their subsistence, pharmacopeia and work” (Art. 
31).284 The state has to facilitate delimitation of these lands on the basis 
of indigenous customary rights and must ensure “legal recognition of 
the title according to customary rights, even in cases where indigenous 
 
therefore a need to develop effective means to consult with the community in question, so that 
they have participation in decision-making that is free, fair and informed. See id.  
 277. Portant Promotion et Protection des Droits des Populations Autochtones, Loi Février 25, 
2011. For an analysis of the law See Rep. of the Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the 
Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.5, ¶ 40 (July 11, 2011) (analyzing this 
specific Republic of Congo law).  
 278. The use of the term “pygmy” is, however, prohibited by the law for its pejorative 
connotation.  
 279. The Situation of the Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of the Congo, supra note 277.  
 280. See id. at 12.  
 281. Id. at 13.  
 282. Id.  
 283. Id.  
 284. Id.  
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peoples do not previously possess any kind of formal title (Art. 32).”285 
Indigenous peoples can only be removed from their lands for public 
purposes (Art. 33) and when expropriated, they must benefit from the 
advantages provided by law (Art. 34). Exploitation, expropriation, and 
conservation of natural resources and land are only possible after a 
sociological and environmental impact assessment study (Art. 35).286 
Indigenous peoples have a right to decide on strategies and priorities for 
valorizing the lands and natural resources (Art. 36) and must be 
consulted when projects affect their lands, resources or way of life 
(Arts. 38-39).287   
Though they have not adopted specific legislation to recognize 
rights over traditional land and resources for indigenous peoples, in 
some countries, the existing legal framework has been interpreted in 
such a way as to achieve results similar to that intended by the 
Congolese law. In 2003, a case was brought to the South African 
Constitutional Court by the Richtersveld indigenous community on the 
basis of the Restitution Land Claim Act with the objective of being 
granted an order for restoring their land from which they had been 
dispossessed in order to operate mining activities.288 The court 
recognized that indigenous ownership of land occupied prior to 
colonization survives change in regime as long as it is not clearly 
extinguished by law or act of Crown, state or court.289  To evidence 
indigenous ownership, the court agreed to look at customary law which 
existed prior to colonization.290 Beyond the recognition of indigenous 
land ownership, the case also constitutes an example of emerging state 
practice aimed at redressing indigenous peoples for the lands they have 
been deprived of.291 Similarly, in 2006, the eviction of the San 
community from their land in Botswana led to an investigation into their 
right over the territories they traditionally occupied.292 On the basis of 
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the common law doctrine of aboriginal title, the High Court of 
Botswana recognized the existence of land rights to San hunter-
gatherers while declaring that the removal of the community living in 
the Central Kalahari Game Reserve was unlawful.293 
Practice at the regional African level shows that although the 
situation concerning traditional lands and resources of indigenous 
peoples is still problematic, concern over their rights is growing both at 
the regional level as well as at the state level, and initiatives have been 
taken to bring the existing legal framework further in conformity with 
the spirit and content of international instruments such as the ILO 
Convention 169 or even the UNDRIP.   
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The current contribution has shown that there is a consensus at the 
international level to consider indigenous peoples as beneficiaries of 
human rights to be exercised individually or collectively. Even though it 
has proved impossible to agree on a definition of indigenous peoples, 
the practice of human rights bodies has shown that a workable 
alternative could be found by identifying criteria defining indigenous 
peoples.294 The criteria used at the universal level are traditional lands, 
historical continuity, distinct cultural characteristics, non-dominance, 
and self-identification and group consciousness.295 In Africa, “historical 
continuity” as a criteria has been criticized for being irrelevant to the 
continent and the emphasis is put on marginalization.296 The result is 
that many traditional communities in Africa fulfill the requirement to be 
called indigenous peoples.297  
Indigenous peoples possess a whole set of rights from which the 
right to land and resources is granted a cardinal position in the 
international legal instruments on indigenous peoples because 
traditional land and resources are essential to what they are; and without 
a right of access to their land and resources, indigenous peoples’ rights 
would often be meaningless.298 The right to traditional land and 
resources include the right of ownership over traditional land and 
resources, a right to be consulted and to receive prior consent when 
decisions affecting their land and resources are taken.299 Expropriation 
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is nevertheless possible for public purposes in which case-effective 
compensation must be provided. 
With regard to the phenomenon of land grab in Africa, it has been 
shown that in these land deals between state governments and foreign 
actors, the indigenous peoples who leave from the lands are often 
forgotten. They are seldom consulted, do not have a say in the final 
decision and do not participate in the profits that the deals generate.300 
The indigenous peoples’ rights to traditional lands and resources as they 
have been interpreted by the human rights implementation bodies on the 
continent, however, make many of the large scale land acquisitions 
questionable in terms of law. If the land in question is traditionally 
owned—as a good amount of the land in Africa is—indigenous and 
traditional communities living on the land have property rights over the 
land. Therefore, states cannot sell these lands without proper 
consultation and consent. As a result, these lands must be returned to 
the traditional communities, or alternatively, the communities must be 
fully and effectively compensated. 
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